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The Eventful Articulation of Singularities - or, "Chasing Angels" 




To make new work, one should "personalize[...] a composed singularity of vital movements in [such] a 
way that it could collectively spread" (Massumi 2001) (1) 
 
I want to attempt to pose a number of questions today which seem to me to keep coming back in the historically-
peculiar context of expert art practices' and practitioners' entry into the higher and research degree context of the 
UK university. These questions will also inevitably entail a critical review of issues relating to the professional 
practices of writing and publication in that university context, where it continues to be the case that publishable 
writing in certain "thetic" registers and projects provides the measure against which other modes of research 
practice are tested. In order to look forward, since this critical backward-looking can be tiresome, I want in 
addition to focus on questions relating to new work, under the heading of "eventful articulations", or "chasing 
angels". 
The question as to whether or not one might make new work in the higher degree research context whose quality is 
recognized by the extra-university arts communities seems to me to be unresolved in general terms, some of which 
relate to the institutional setup of the higher degree and research contexts, but also to be unresolvable, more 
importantly, in terms of available performance studies discourses. There are a number of historically-recent bases 
for this situation of discursive lack or oversight or reticence, but others which can be traced through older 
traditions of writing, and which as such increase the tenacity of the dilemma which results from them. We don't 
have time today to look at the full range so I want to identify some clusters of "difficulty" which it seems to me 
that some of us here need - for ethical reasons at the very least - to address as soon as possible. 
The first is marked "professional, expert, disciplinary mastery"; the second concerns the "the regulatory and 
ontologizing power of lexicalisation and the clause"; the third concerns the quotidian, the banal, pedestrian 
pleasures and the aesthetics of 'making do'; the fourth concerns "textual, interdisciplinary and practice turns"; the 
fifth Spectator Studies masquerading as Performance Studies in the university; the sixth makes the distinction 
between conservative practices and their 'radical'or 'subversive' thematizations; the seventh looks at what Brian 
Massumi, focused on art practices, has called "qualitative transformations"; the eighth is concerned with his notion 
of ontogenetics; the ninth is concerned with "singularity, affective intensity, situation and event"; the tenth looks at 
mixed-mode metapractices or epistemic practices in the knowledge-economy; the eleventh takes the term "the 
body", and strikes it out; the twelfth takes the term "theory and practice" and strikes it out. 
I have used terms like expert, arts-disciplinary and professional for knowledge-political and historically-specific 
reasons. My first observation here is that in a number of major writers of Cultural and Performance Studies in the 
later 20thC, "disciplinarity" tends to appear only to be rejected; and neither "professional" nor "expert" tend to 
figure in the index to their work. This should serve as a warning light with regard to the possibility of constitutive 
mismatch between expert writing and the mixed-mode work of arts-expert practitioners. Meanwhile, some of you 
will be familiar with aspects of the post-WWII drive toward broader approaches to a "demystified", widely-
accessed and popular "creativity", together with moves in the direction of a wider and more generalised access to 
art-practices. I argue that these moves in the university context have brought with them the corollary of a 
dwindling focus on questions of singularity, arts-disciplinary mastery, and the institutional aspects of art practices. 
In turn, a number of persuasive publications contributed over the same later 20thC period to the development of a 
taste for the everyday in place of institutionally-ratified and rarified disciplines: amongst them Michel de Certeau's 
late 1970s "aesthetic of making-do" 
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 and affirmation of performance in everyday life developed the Goffman 
tradition by focusing on the notion of a pedestrian or everyday poetics (albeit one regulated by linguistic and 
literary theoretical tropes). The growing popular interest in the quotidian and the banal tended, in the later 20thC, 
to combine with both modernist traditions of interrogation and contestation of dominant forms, and the drive to 
wider access to higher education, producing an ideologically-charged scenario, focused in the university at least on 
suspicion of the institutional in general, and on challenges to or "subversion" of knowledge-institutions (which 
included theatre and dance traditions, designated spaces and mainstream practices). 
The foregrounding of performance in everyday life has been persuasively articulated in Performance Studies in the 
UK since the early 1990s 
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 . It was combined progressively with the development of performance as an acceptable 
academic discipline - which seemed to be dependent upon the availability of discipline-specific discourses; 
secondly with the textual and interdisciplinary turns of post-Saussurean cultural theoretics; and thirdly with the 
growing student numbers registering on performance and performing arts courses. This combination of factors 
produced a quite particular set of constitutively ambiguous circumstances in a university which was at the same 
time a major player in the knowledge-conservative scriptural economy or economy of writing, and a major site of 
what were self-styled challenges to conservative ideologies. 
Some of these factors and their constitutive ambiguities continue to be articulated apparently unquestioningly in 
texts as recently published as Nick Kaye's Site-Specific Art 
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 and the Pearson and Shanks Theatre/Archaeology 
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 . 
What is curious to me about these indicative texts, however, and indeed about the seminal texts published in the 
context of critical theory in the university in the later decades of the 20thC, comes from the fact that they argue for 
interrogation and subversion of institutions of various kinds, but do so from their writers' own positions as 
consummate, institutionally-authorised professionals and disciplinary experts, in academic writing, its publication 
and pedagogic practices. Each works within a specific disciplinary field and framework in the university, as highly 
knowledge-conservative institution, or in the wider university-associated community. 
Meanwhile in 2001 Jon McKenzie, another institutionally-authorised professional academic writer 
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 has exposed 
the extent to which the supposedly subversive - or the "liminal norm" - has occupied the university performance 
mainstream, to such an extent that, he argues, like liminal rites of passage in pre-industrial societies, this 
university-performance making has lost its self-assertedly challenging currency, and serves, instead, as a pedagogic 
tool which "almost always reinforce[s] existing social structures" (51). (I should add at this point, perhaps, that 
McKenzie's own sympathies with regard to disciplinary mastery are revealed by his subtitle to Perform ... Or Else , 
which reads From Discipline to Performance : here, once again, is the self-declared contestation of a disciplinarity 
whose importance the writer himself, sympathetic to everyday performances, fails to grasp.) 
I have provided here one very brief snapshot of the already-problematic situation in performance research in the 
university to which arts-expert performance practitioners have relatively recently been invited to contribute. My 
first anxiety, in these sorts of terms, is focused on the question of the lack of empirical fit, between on the one hand 
the institutionally-dominant discourses and practices of Performance Studies in the late 20th and early 21stC, and 
on the other the arts-disciplinary or professional experience of performance-making, the expert-practitioner ethos, 
ethical engagement, sensing, intuitive play, drive and attitude, as well as the evaluative apparatuses specific to 
professional practices within this new group of candidates. 
In short, I am concerned not so much with the individual practitioners involved, as with a lack of fit between two 
complex economies of practice - for this is exactly what we are concerned with here. In addition, I am concerned 
with the manifest inability of some of my colleagues in the wider university context to engage in critical auto-
reflection with their own discourse-production and with what are the highly conservative philosophical matrixes 
which organize, authorize and regulate that production. 
In a text published in the year 2000 
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 my colleague Peter Osborne made a number of observations, and one or two 
suggestions, which struck me as useful in the sorts of situation I have been set out. The first suggestion - almost a 
throwaway - was to identify himself and his peers as "professional philosophers". This came at a time when I was 
wondering, with some irritation, why so many of my colleagues, in the university, persisted in eschewing the terms 
"professional" and "institutional", despite the patently obvious fact that many of us were and are both professional 
writer-researchers and educators, and employed, gainfully, by the university as a major institutional player in the 
economy of writing. By professional philosopher, Osborne simply signalled, in terms of what he calls "the 
professional field of philosophical production", that disciplinary training which would enable authorised access to 
"the historically developed and institutionally structured space of philosophical positions and possibilities" (86). 
Clearly Osborne's account of the professional philosopher errs, in epistemological terms, on the side of being and 
having , rather than doing , despite his stated concern with professional production. In other words, his position 
still derives from backward-looking, accounting, and property ownership. He should, as far as I am concerned, 
given that he works in a writing-focused or scriptural 
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 rather than an oral economy, have added that he actually 
also functions professionally as an expert published academic writer and educator, within the university. That it is 
this precisely institutional setup that enables him to practise philosophy , in order to participate, thereby, in certain 
quite specific and audited processes of production. "The philosopher", in other words, is a professional 
practitioner, a writer-educator mastering certain expert registers, whose writing is submitted to quasi-independent 
audit through the mechanisms specific to what is in fact a largely unexamined publishing industry. The latter 
industry, conservative and corporate, driven by marketing, is tightly linked to the university, on whose behalf, 
effectively, it carries out processes of evaluation and dissemination, upon which the university very quietly 
depends. 
If we were to develop the philosopher's wording of his professional identity, to allow him to focus on writing-
productivity and its evaluation, rather than on being and having, we might need to add, the following to his initial 
account, in order to provide a better account of what s/he practises and in what terms: "and is able to continue to 
provide evidence of mastery of certain institutionalized disciplinary registers of practice, linked to certain modes 
of production, to certain production processes, and to certain established modes of engagement, evaluative 
mechanisms and modes and types of outcome" . 
My next suggestion is that in the name of professional practitioners everywhere, we substitute "writer", and 
"writerly", for "philosopher" and "philosophical", to give the following account of the professional writing-
practitioner, who has authorised access to: 
  
the historically developed and institutionally structured space of writerly positions and possibilities [and 
is able to continue to provide evidence of mastery of certain institutionalized disciplinary registers of 
writing , linked to certain modes of production, to certain production processes, and to certain 
established modes of engagement, evaluative mechanisms and modes and types of outcome ] 
 
Next, let's substitute "choreographer", and "choreographic" for "writer", and "writerly". The professional 
choreographer, then, has authorised access to: 
  
the historically developed and institutionally structured space of choreographic positions and 
possibilities, [ and is able to continue to provide evidence of mastery of certain institutionalized 
disciplinary registers of choreographic practices , linked to certain modes of production, to certain 
production processes, and to certain established modes of engagement, evaluative mechanisms and 
modes and types of outcome ] 
 
In the terms proper to this "lesson in writing" 
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 , we might begin to get some sense that the professional 
philosopher and writer both practise writing , using certain complex disciplinary registers. Secondly, that I myself 
and many of my colleagues, as professional writers and educators, also practise a writing misunderstood as the 
reified "theory"; this writing practice, whatever some notorious figures might have said about it, is once again a 
matter of disciplinary mastery, institutionally-authorised. More generally, we might begin, from this point of view, 
to acknowledge that this "writing practice" is a "knowledge-conservative" activity. Our professional identities 
themselves depend upon the ways we continue to manage and develop the practices of that disciplinary mastery, 
whether we're called Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Darcey Bussell, Ariane Mnouchkine or Lloyd Newson. 
Hence disciplinary mastery is an expert doing, rather more than it is a having. Its audit continues, in 
institutionalized contexts. 
In these sorts of terms, "disciplinary mastery" is not likely to be usefully qualified as "embodied" (a term used in 
today's programme): the qualification rephysicalises the performer to the detriment of her status as expert-
practitioner. That expertise, besides, always requires her exercise of a judgement which is far from "embodied" (it 
is too complex for this to account for it), even though its outcomes, in a dancer, are focused in/as bodywork. 
Judgement always signals, let's not forget, those disciplinary choices not made, which ghost (hence thicken) the 
physical. Every bodywork option taken, in addition, always includes in it evidence of decisions made in an ethics 
of practice. Taken together, these sorts of disciplinary choices are diminished once qualified as "embodied". 
Disciplinary mastery, that is to say, is always relational: it is undertaken somewhere, by and for someone, with 
reference to (and thereby rearticulating the terms of) one or another disciplinary tradition - for Deleuze, for 
example, that tradition is philosophical 
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 , and ceaselessly rearticulated - and to some end or ends (which signal 
positioning and the political). Where we differ, as professionals, is also worth signalling, but in order to do so we 
need to start from the explicit acknowledgement of our institutionally-ratified professional identities. I return to the 
question of expert arts-practitioner specificity in the context of what Massumi 
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 calls "qualitative transformations". 
My next question, with issues of disciplinary mastery and professional identity in mind, concerns the extent to 
which, looking back over some 30 years of university writing-production and dissemination in the arts, it might 
also be possible for us to identify, in the writing which excited university professionals over that period, an anti-
institutional bias and a thematized contestation of dominant cultural forms, performed - ironically enough - from 
within the university as knowledge-conservative institution. Peter Osborne has identified the 1960s and 1970s US 
avant-garde in terms of a generation of American artists entering the university for the first time, a situation 
overlaid with memories of WWII and lived experiences of the Vietnam War. 
He notes of conceptual art of the period that it was viewed as "a mode of artistic production [purportedly 
determined] by a philosophical form"; and he proceeds to wonder whether this might not seem to locate it in 
opposition to the older conception of art as sensuous particularity or aesthetic . He goes on, then, to ask a question 
I find interesting in the present context, and that I should want to pose to the "discursivists" in Dance Studies: 
"what does it mean to specify or delimit a particular kind of art with reference to its [supposed] determination by 
another cultural field?" (86). What might it mean for disciplinary mastery and creative invention, in the performing 
arts in the research context and beyond it, to specify or delimit dance with reference to its supposed determination 
by the cultural field of discourse production, with a particular emphasis on theories of representation, 
problematised identities, and on the production of expert registers of "performance writing" from an expert 
spectator perspective - since it is from this expert spectator perspective, whether its writers declare it or not, that 
much performance-writing is actually produced. Once again, I am pointing to a mismatch between dominant 
"performance-writing" positions, and expert practitioner positions themselves. 
There are political implications which emerge from the position I have set out above, and a certain challenge: if the 
discourses concerned with the subversion of dominant forms have appealed to some of us professionally employed 
by a university institution such as this one, how might we, from a self-marginalising, self-affirmingly "subversive" 
position, concerned with liminalities and hence not with institutional decision-making, effect "knowledge-
political" change in the university itself as institutional setup? I have spoken and written elsewhere, at some length 
and to no great effect, about the hypocrisy of those of us who continue their assault on institutions from within the 
university as institution, and through the expert mastery of writing - almost as though some of us were still stuck in 
an unresolved Electra or Oedipal crisis. Patently I am not arguing against critical engagement with dominant 
forms, from within the university as knowledge-conservative institution (since my intervention here is itself critical 
of certain dominant forms). Instead, I am arguing that critical interrogation only "works", where we first master the 
discipline concerned - and acknowledge (in meta-praxiological terms) our own disciplinary mastery as such. Few 
published Performance Studies writers actually interrogate their own writing-production, in compositional, indeed 
aesthetic terms. 
My own suggestion here, as writer-educator, is that we might all benefit, in the context of authorised practices in 
the university, from separating out, when we review the writing of notorious seminal figures in the later decades of 
the 20thC, what these writers or this writing thematize , from what that disciplinary writing also performs . If you 
have ever been struck, as were some of us here, by the 20thC suggestion that there is no distinction to be made 
between form and content, then you might want to go back and take another look at the writerly conservatism of 
those who made that suggestion. Published writing in expert registers and established disciplinary fields enables 
the writer concerned to thematize the interrogation of dominant forms (except those represented by the university 
itself and the publishing industry). In this case, there is a mismatch between what that seminal writer says , and 
what he does . 
You may have some difficulty with my observation which emerges from these comments, which is that however 
radicalising notorious writer-educators like Barthes, Foucault and Deleuze, might have felt (and continue to feel ) 
to some readers 
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 , at particular moments in student lives, these same professional writers had perfectly conserved, 
in that writing, the codes and conventions of expert or professional writing itself, in terms appropriate both to the 
academy, and to the corporate world of the publishing industry. They simultaneously thematized and articulated 
apparently radical proposals with regard to dominant forms or modes of production, while practising the latter. 
Each of these writers, meanwhile, has signed his output, in such a way as to assert his intellectual property rights 
over it. It is signature work, this writing so many of us have referred to, by which I mean that it does not simply 
find its place in a greater intertextual system. Instead, it is owned; singular; property; conservative of proprietary 
registers and values. It is appropriate, as the publishing industry itself has attested. 
Each of these writers, in addition, whatever claims he might have made with regard to knowledge-systems, 
intertextuality, logocentricity, theories of the other, the metaphysics of presence, or the "becoming-body", has 
perfectly maintained a wholly conservative, institutionally defined and institutionally evaluated writing as the 
means to his effective articulation of that project. The thetic qualities of the registers mastered, the institutionalized 
access to and mastery of "the historically developed and institutionally structured space of writerly positions and 
possibilities", are startling, when we return to look at what each writer-practitioner practised , as distinct from what 
he thematized. 
What might it mean to argue here that radical perspectives, in this framework, are only achievable to the extent that 
the writer-inventor has mastered the discipline which affords her or him access to the profession and its means to 
thematize radicalism effectively? What might we infer, on performing arts' behalf, from this curious capacity of the 
supposedly radical practitioner of institutionally-defined writing, that he or she has also performed largely without 
critical auto-reflection, the role of perfect professional obedience to the demands of the conservative institutions of 
writing and publishing? Each has remained wholly obedient, if I might put it this way, to the order of the clause, to 
the order of subject and predicate, and, what's more, to the order of lexical choice (where nominalisation tends to 
dominate process words, for example, in certain complex registers). Yet one of Peter Osborne's other useful 
observations is that writing, when it is a matter of expert registers, also ontologizes - or confers being, in terms of 
semantic norms upon - what it might otherwise seem only to write "about". 
What might it mean to claim that terms like " the body ", or " theory and practice ", ontologize in terms of the 
conservative orders of writing, when they are applied, in the university research context, to expert mixed-mode 
practices? These are, whether you want to hear this or not, linguistic colonizers of mixed-mode heterogeneous 
practices. When Foucault and Deleuze, in conversation in 1972, are published in these sorts of terms: 
  




they are doing rather more than to write "about theory and practice" - whatever these two nouns are understood to 
mean. That these nouns would seem to be understood commonsensically - rather than in expert/technical terms - by 
many readers 
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 does not help the "knowledge-political" task we have before us. Each term, in my experience, 
signals something reified. The Foucault-Deleuze writing, read in different contexts of use, ontologizes, or asserts 
the pre-existence of a particular mode of being, with regard to what they might otherwise seem merely to write 
about . For example, it asserts, as already-given, a difference between "theory" (always first) and "practice"; 
whereas my argument is that wherever these terms are used, what we are doing, even as readers, is to practise 
something, always in relational terms (by which I mean somewhere, to some end or ends, on someone's behalf). 
Yet this sort of observation by Foucault and Deleuze has been popular, in my experience, because it seems to fit 
empirically with dominant received ideas, according to which " theory " is one " thing ", and " practice ", similarly 
nominalised, an other. Of "things", Brian Massumi has observed more recently however, that "a thing is when it 
isn't doing...when it is in a state of arrest..."). When Foucault and Deleuze went on, in 1972, in these sorts of terms: 
  
Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to 
another (206) 
they were using politically-appealing tropes while also establishing a schematic "word-world", conjured up in 
terms of highly conventional patternings which are syntactically-specific in a literal and not a metaphoric sense. 
These patternings, then, were both political, because they were positioned with regard to then-dominant "world-
views", and entailed point of view, and they continue today to be world-productive, rather than world-representing. 
What they achieved, regardless of user-intentionality, was and continues to be the nominalisation (asserting 
"thingness" over process) together with the ongoing separation of what actually constitute two different modes of 
activity - or practices - through an apparently still appealing recourse to spatial metaphor. Such spatializing tropes 
asserted the pre-existence of a mappable and architecturally-constructed "world" which also happened and still 
happens to be dehumanized, anonymized, deprofessionalised and depersonalised. In this landscape, in other words, 
nobody is present and active . (Yet so many of us felt, at the time, and in that context, that we recognised it, if not 
ourselves in it.) 
What we might need to note, in 2003, is that both nouns used in that early 1970s quote emerge from a professional-
writerly Imaginary; and, to the extent that they refer , they do so from within the parameters of a writerly and 
educational professing, through the mechanisms specific to it, and in terms of the quite particular scriptural 
economy of the university. Their habitus 
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 , if I might be so bold in retrospect, was writerly - as was their training, 
their mode of engagement, the processes and modes of production specific to them; their professional and public 
identity, in short. 
If their own professional practice, as a consequence, could only be initiated, produced in and regulated by the 
terms specific to expert writing, within the scriptural economy, on what bases might we expect their observations 
to have anything whatsover to give to mixed-mode art-expert disciplinary practitioners - unless , that is, we are 
prepared to assert that mixed-mode expert arts-disciplinary practices are actually produced on the basis of a textual 
model, through textualist means, and to textualising ends 
16
 . I am not prepared to accept this assertion - but before 
I provide my reasons for this refusal, I want to add, with regard to these seminal or notorious later 20thC writers, 
that much of the writing itself is challenging, provocative, inspirational, fine in detail, argument, and observation. 
What it is not is expert-arts-practitioner-centred. When Zizek muses, in his recent Organs Without Bodies 
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 , on 
Deleuzian approaches to art, he takes that art as already given, proffered as such; already signed, already exhibited, 
already viewed, already sold, already written about : "Perhaps Jackson Pollock is the ultimate "Deleuzian painter": 
does his action-painting not directly render this flow of pure becoming...?" (5). "Pollock", named here, presupposes 
a body of painting and of art-critical writing, through which other readers will reproduce "the artist" as name, 
within a textualist economy . The word, here, reinforces the effect of various institutions whose judgement has 
already been brought to bear on - indeed to produce and reproduce - past mastery. It is unavailable, as such, to the 
production and evaluation of new work. 
The fine, provocative writing of a Barthes, a Foucault, a Deleuze functions then, philosophically , as the outcome 
of schooled, long-standing and sustained professional practices of observation and writing-production. As such, 
these writers' work can be aligned - where expert performances are our concern - with the position and the 
activities of expert spectating, reflection and abstraction. It generalizes, as Spectator Studies invites it to do; and it 
brings with it and maintains the ground-plan on which expert observation itself, as well as the object of expert 
observation, are staged. Its objective, from that usefully distanced position, is the further production of writing in 
expert registers. What's more, I would add that despite the declared aspiration of some of these writers to 
transcendancy, that philosophical art-writing also articulates its context of writing, and whatever was troubling as 
well as passionate and aspirational, in that context of which it provided a discursive (and published) component. 
From this point of view, as Hal Foster has pointed out, critical-theoretical writing should perhaps be seen as 
symptom pointing us to the ongoing troubles and passions specific to its context of production. 
But let me come back to my refusal: I am not prepared to accept any such writerly assertion, in spite of the 
authoritative voices which argue for the discursivist nature of dance 
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 , since it would be to give way to the late 
20thC, historically-specific, and now outdated textual and interdisciplinary turns of the post-WWII context; to 
those post-Saussurean turns, according to which art practices were modelled on the text. Of this post-Saussurean 
turn or turns, Osborne has noted, their power derives "from its combination of simplicity and generality, ...its 
indifferen[ce] to the specificities of [the materials] concerned", which "had the effect of creating ...a new trans- or 
anti-disciplinary object, the text" (22). Yet the material specificities of expert dance are not a matter of indifference 
to the profession and its margins; nor is choreographic practice, whatever other forceful voices might argue, either 
"text", or "discourse practice", despite the desire to make it so, of various academics in the university. The textual 
turn and the interdisciplinary turn seek to substitute the pursuit of "meaning" for a concern with the specificity of 
aesthetic mastery. 
Under the regime of the late 20thC textual turn and its dominant models of writing-production in the university, 
what was sacrificed, according to Peter Osborne, was an engagement with the formal, sensible, transformative and 
existential specificities of the expert mixed-mode arts-disciplinary practice itself. What was sacrificed - 
indicatively - was an expert-practice-centred enquiry into composition, which Massumi also identifies, where 
effective/affective art practices operate, in part at least, in terms of "the unfolding of an absolutely singular [and 
exemplary] worlding relational whole" (174). Massumi goes on to suggest, with regard to composition, that it 
involves the personalisation of "a composed singularity of vital movements [effected] in [such] a way that it could 
collectively spread"(250). 
"Collectively spread" has considerable interest, in my experience, with regard to expert decision-making in the 
devised-practice workshop. It enables us to sidestep, at the same time, still problematic notions of practitioner-
intentionality-informed decisions, as well as equally problematic notions of cultural determination/s and 
representations. 
From this point of view, and with no disrespect to notorious later 20thC professional writer-educators, I simply 
want to argue that the discursivist " worlding " of Foucault, Deleuze et al, whatever their professed (hence, 
thematized) sympathies, does not fit, empirically, with my own experience of expert-practitioner choreographic 
practice - pursued, negotiated, driven, developed, dissected, defined, refined, despaired-of, compromised, re-
thematized, reinvigorated, in creative-professional registers. Where so many and so markedly differentiated action-
types are involved, signalling such diverse ongoing work-practices and processes, who would be able to declare, 
seeing only the outcome, that this complex, ongoing, painful, challenging activity is not an appropriately 
challenging and illuminating research activity ? In the case of professional creative practices, it is also a research 
undertaking whose outcome is critically judged in the wider arts communities - which thereby serve, in part at 
least, a similar function to that of the publishing industry's audit and "support" of written research outcomes in the 
university. The wider arts communities, in turn, and regardless of the self-marginalisation of certain artists, impress 
their measure upon arts-practitioners' decision-making processes. 
In that same quote, then - "practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay 
from one practice to another" - these seminal writers in the post- WWII context were actually writing about (and 
objectifying, without identification of subject or agency) two registers of writing practice - which they were not 
able to grasp as such - performed to different ends. "Theory" then, whatever Foucault meant by the term, is not a 
"thing", but rather a set of authorised and appropriate institutional practices, some explanatory and some - in expert 
or technical registers - professionally-specific and hence excluding; performed in certain institutionally-recognised 
registers then, and to certain institutionally-authorised ends. Let's say so, and then reword the last quote from this 
perspective: 
  
innovative arts-expert practices, viewed in the times of their emergence, can be seen (for example, by 
the choreographer) to perform a set of relays from one disciplinary point to another; meanwhile, a 
grasp of mixed-mode meta-practices enables us to identify abstractable or schematic relays, in expert 
practices, from one arts-disciplinary point to another . 
I want to ask you to keep this revision in your mind's eye, while watching one set of after-images of complex 
professional practices which come from Christopher Wheeldon's work for the Royal Opera House with Darcey 
Bussell and Jonathan Cope 
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 . I want to know why so many of my colleagues find this video so difficult not to 
watch, so much as to discuss. Is it possible that what I call the "new critical orthodoxies" of the later 20thC fail to 
provide appropriate means of engagement for some of us to view innovative, signature practices which are both 
conservative of the disciplinary core, and liable to expand it from within? Is it possible that expert spectating, 
within a closet Spectator Studies in the university, fails to find interpretative apparatuses which might exhaust the 
"art effect" or the interpraxiological engagement which is Wheeldon's, in this disciplinary metapractice pursued to 
creative professional and research ends? That they lack, in particular, the means to deal with what is singular 
within its composition? 
In the place of that engagement with singularities, the discursive reproduction of certain syntactic patterns - such as 
those entailed in uses of the term "the body"- asserts the pre-existence of similar schematic patterns organizing the 
extra-textual real. They ontologize on the basis of performance product, identifying effects and confusing them 
with causes. 
I do not want to abandon that abject term,"the body", quite yet, because it seems to me that it has become a 
discursive reflex used in the workshop and the specialist journals, as much as it is in the university. The term "the 
body" is ontologizing: it asserts a particular position of being and observation, with regard not to expert arts-
disciplinary bodywork practices - which are actually doings, not things or beings - but to an everyday or pedestrian 
body, arrested in its apparent "thing-ness". In Performance Studies it is at one and the same time aspirational - it 
aspires in modernist terms to a "general theory" - and servile (it attempts wrong-headedly to objectify practices of 
expert subjectification). In its recourse to the noun and definite article it is anonymizing and it is 
deprofessionalizing. That use attempts, regardless of user-intentionality, to impose itself upon movement, 
sensation and affect, in Massumi's terms; to neutralize or anaesthetize the teleoaffective potential of certain 
disciplinary practices. It is lexically and grammatically synoptic; it assumes the position of observation of the 
authoritative subject, while objectifying its other. Its use, besides, in places like this one, is curious to the extent 
that while Darcey Bussell and I equally "have" "a body", equally "are", "the body", neither of us would want, as 
professionals, on that basis, to be located at different points on a single physicalised continuum. 
The expression, "the body" is equally ontologizing in its erasures and implicature: its use in the research-practice 
situation harks back to a range of social sciences disciplinary registers. Its relationality is fixed: it brings with it a 
particular floor plan on which the arts-practice and the expert spectator slot neatly into pre-ordained positions, 
from which clearly defined expert practices emerge. The position of the user of the term "the body" is that of 
expert-spectating, and as such it belongs only within a Spectator Studies, in the university, which does not speak its 
name. (Spectator Studies, as some of you are well aware, is only marketable under the mask of Performance 
Studies, the fastest growing and most democratic fold of the disciplinary field, as well as the most obedient and 
readily resourced. I have nothing whatsoever against Spectator Studies, and I am sympathetic to those who assert 
the creative engagement of spectators. Nonetheless, I would not pay to watch one at work.) 
The expression "theory and practice", as we saw in Deleuze and Foucault, asserts the pre-existence of an imaginary 
and conservatively regulated, scriptural world of writing, within which what are actually two modes of complex 
practice are separated out, categorized and opposed. This is a similar world to which Bourdieu referred in 1980 in 
what he called The Logic of Practice 
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 where he noted that "[i]t is not easy to speak of practice other than 
negatively". This was not least the case, he added at the end of the 1970s, in the case of "those aspects of practice 
that are seemingly most mechanical, most opposed to the logic of thought and discourse"(80). Where a "language 
of consciousness", Bourdieu added, could be opposed to "the language of the mechanical model", such an 
opposition would remain compelling, to the extent that it corresponds to a "dominant world-view". Such 
oppositional formulae and the "thinking in couples" which informs them, in other words, are affectively invested, 
rather more than they rationally re-present what is materially exterior to them. 
They are also compelling, in my experience, to the extent that they were once authoritatively formulated, but have 
passed, more recently, into commonsensical speech used in certain sorts of contexts. They can be perceived, 
inappropriately, to be friendly to those of theoretical disposition or attitude, in these contexts. I cannot stress 
however too forcefully the troubling implications, for the future of expert performance-making practices in the 
research context, of commonsensical formulae used notionally to certain immediate pragmatic ends, in contexts of 
mixed-mode performance-making practice. 
Where the formal and authoritative, world-creating wording, which was situationally, contextually, and relationally 
specific in its context of emergence, has now assumed the status of commonsense, and is used notionally within an 
oral economy of practice, by mixed-mode practitioners, to seem to satisfy an immediate, almost certainly 
interactive need, then what is actually a gross distortion is being practised. That distortion further damages the 
hypothesis, to which I am otherwise operating, which is that these are in fact two singularly different economies of 
practice, with wholly independent organizational and regulatory machinery, modes of operation, temporal 
functions, expected outcomes, and knowledge-economy status. 
There is much at stake here and there is no easy way of saying this: if you are using terms like "theory and 
practice"or "mind and body" with regard to a mixed-mode professional context, please stop. If you are taking up 
that old formula "the thinking body" to refer to expert practitioners and practices, please stop. 
In Brian Massumi's argument none of these terms, each of which by the way has an everyday significance as well 
as a technical one, is appropriate when our principal objective should be to attempt to identify the means to 
effecting qualitative transformations in art-making practices , to which we can by definition only look forward. 
At stake in Massumi's observations on writing's looking backwards (to "anaesthetize") and the forward-looking of 
qualitative transformations, is thus the question of the temporal order of inventive practices, in contrast with the 
times of naming and analysis, which are ontologizing, imposing writing's orders on the complexities and 
differences involved in experience, while asserting (and often persuading) that these are "already there". 
The time specific to what I call chasing angels is fragile. Expert practitioners cannot be sure that they have "caught 
one", except on those occasions when the decision made is applauded in the time of the emergent event. In 
addition, an angel tends to be not-yet-seen, but recognizable when she appears, as well as always singular. This is a 
curious epistemological burden. It is equally the case that angels are marked by luminosity, rather than by 
substance, not least where they appear between expert performers and the choreographer, rather than in a 
materially-single substance or site. Because they are not located materially somewhere , they disappear, as quickly, 
in the same event, and troublingly. In Ariane Mnouchkine's account of making Tartuffe 
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 she indicates that in the 
case of this nowhere (substantial) of emergence, spectators tend in the event to assume that "the actor has done 
something", because that seems to provide a material account of the immaterial; whereas something has actually 
emerged which is "owned" by no single performer, and is event-relational. Hence angel-time as well as its 
knowledge-status is fragile, and the means of its recognition, before the event, by professionals, always involves a 
half-desperate hope, a calculation, always a gamble. 
What is also at stake here is disciplinary specificity itself, of which I would simply say, reductively, that most 
disciplines are constituted after evaluation of something or things produced and classified; stand still and look 
back, or reproduce new insights with regard to the already known. Massumi considers these to be an-aesthetizing. 
In complete contrast are those creative practitioner disciplines whose production processes are calculated not so 
much in terms of that discipline's past, but on their capacity to provide the potential for singular, qualitative 
transformations of it. 
When Massumi writes, then, about what he calls "continuities under qualitative transformation" - one set of which 
involves expert bodywork which combines persona (a set of abstractions materially manifest) and another, 
disciplinarity (another set of "incorporeal materialities") - I begin to imagine that I am hearing something which 
would not have been out of place, for a few fleeting moments sewn unevenly through the time available, when 
Christopher Wheeldon began to work, on Tryst with Darcey Bussell and Jonathan Cope, or when Kim Brandstrup 





Choreographer Kim Brandstrup at work with Arc Dance Company in rehearsals for Hamlet at Jerwood Space, 
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Whereas ontologizing practices, Massumi notes, are inevitably backward-looking, backward forming, and 
backward-fixing, ontogenetic processes are those which might engender the fleeting being of art in the event of 
expert practice. Because ontologizing wordings assert being on the basis of already-obtained observations and 
knowings, they are unable to account for qualitative transformations, in an event of singular emergence. 
That the as-yet-unperceived is recognised when it emerges depends on the choreographer's expert ability to slot 
into place a considerable number of heterogeneous schematic patternings, some elements of which will tend to 
trigger particular sorts of engagements on the part of spectators (as well as, in all probability, of dancers). The fine 
detail produced through experience and perception is ceaselessly shuffled and slotted again, I think, and 
differently, by different participants and onlookers. (A performer's "It feels right" is of a quite different order, for 
example, from a spectator's "I couldn't take my eyes off it", even though the words may be excited by what is 
otherwise taken to be "the same" performance moment.) Hence while all participants may engage the same sorts of 
generic patternings - one of these involves narrativity in dance; another the structure of the event; another the 
constitution of dance persona and/or dance characterisation; another regulates different perceptions of what 
constitutes expert practice and what constitutes less than expert mastery - it is vital to note that this "practice" 
which seems to unite us is strongly differentiated internally. In Kim Brandstrup's case, some of his shufflings and 
slottings of material - none of which can be identified singly as 'being somewhere specific', since his process and 
aspiration are both movement-focused, rather than place or space-focused - are narrative-productive in function, 
but these may not be acknowledged as such by dancers or onlookers. Because I 'know the story already', I find that 
in the event, I 'clock' its turning-points (or articulations, or 'thresholds'), without needing to discursivise these as 
such. I retain them as a temporal and spatial abstraction, and not as an action-regulatory story. Many are ballet-
disciplinary while others see performers sidelined by design or musical performance; some involve the staging of 
virtuosic performer singularity; some involve the intricate and to the onlooker innumerable operations of 
hypotyposis. Hypotyposis, a major player in the performance economy, is at work when spectators seem to see 
more than they actually see (feelings specific, for example to Hamlet, rather than movements specific to the dancer 
who performs the role); and seem to know more than is given, even when that 'not-given', brought by the onlooker 
in its particulars and detail, is vital to the narrative. I seem to recognise a something which, on the basis of that 
"seeming to recognise", does not need to be provided by the performer or choreographer. Rather, what needs to be 
provided is the space and time vital to my contribution, and a number of schematic frameworks. On this basis, 
dancers can actually do less than they seem to do, as long as spectators recognise the pointers, and work to fill the 
gaps. Of the relationship between narrative schematics, and those actions through which expert-performer 
singularities are made manifest, by the way, Massumi enables me to observe that where narrative schematics 
intrudes thresholds, the performer singularity and the singularity of the performer-performer or performer-





Before I conclude I want to dwell a little longer on the question of the qualitative transformation, but from the 
point of view of creative and professional imperatives pursued in the research context. My argument here is firstly, 
and very reductively, that qualitative transformations are what challenging art professionals are looking for, and 
that this looking for places them always ahead of academic writers, just out of reach; secondly, that qualitative 
transformations, if these are also to be targeted and identified as such in the research context, require of some of us 
that we take on board the burden posed by the need to make explicit the precise bases for our evaluation of art 
disciplinary practices in the university context, as well as the knowledge difficulties this task brings with it, in a 
university still marked by some of the ideological ambiguities that I have attributed to the situation of the later 
20thC. 
This making explicit requires that we focus on what I have called the production metalanguages - some of which 
are teleoaffective - specific to arts-expert performance making along with the mechanisms entailed in making 
aesthetic and ethical judgements which these often tacitly enfold. That this is a field of undertaking which is 
particularly delicate in the university, at least, is illuminated for me by Peter Osborne's observation that the 
university's emphasis on meaning-production in place of the aesthetic and the judgements entailed by the aesthetic 
is post-Kantian, and hence has a long history to it. Noting that 
  
ever since Kant's transcendental critique of the intuitive grounds of ...cognitivism severed the 
connection of aesthetics to semiotics, in the aftermath of the birth of aesthetics as a philosophical 
discipline, at the end of the eighteenth century, the two fields of enquiry have been fundamentally 
estranged.(21) 
today, he adds, it is no exaggeration to say that "this split ... between signification and aesthesis, meaning and 
sensibility", "divorced the theorization of the formal sensible qualities" of the art work "from its representational 
function". Its counterpart, he goes on, is that modern analytical practices "treat [the] signifying function in 
abstraction from both its sensible and its existential qualities". 
What might it mean to declare that, firstly, because the explicit operations of judgements of taste and value have 
tended to be marginalised in the writing produced under the heading of critical-theoretical or cultural-theoretical 
registers in the knowledge-political climate specific to post-WWII, some of us here are unable to accept 
responsibility, in the research-practice contexts, for those judgements of taste and value we tend, on the other hand, 
to utter in the bar after the show? What might it mean, secondly, for expert art practitioners in the research context, 
that the burden of the history of some of us in the university, is such that we are better able to "deal with" 
pedagogic practices and their outcomes which will never meet professional criteria, than with the professional? 
Osborne has added, by the way, that attempts to eliminate the aesthetic from consideration of the artwork have 
simply served to produce the opposite. That is, the aspiration to either the popular or the anti-institutional avant-
garde and the supposedly demystifying strategies or semiological rearticulations these aspirations have involved, 
have simply, through their "failed negation" of it, provided evidence of the " in eliminability of the aesthetic as a 
necessary element of the artwork" (102). Let's say so here, even if that means casting aside some of our later 20thC 
received ideas and the residue of their affective charge. 
Conclusion 
The qualitative ("knowledge-economy", epistemic 
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 ) transformations, which I argue Wheeldon sought in his 
pairing of Jonathan Cope and Darcey Bussell with James Macmillan's score (and a particular, professional agenda), 
were not "owned" by any one of these artists. Rather, "what Darcey Bussell can do " is emergent, in 
wholly relational terms - that is, literally dependent upon the professional input of the choreographer and other 
dancer/s. Hence the qualitative transformations which have marked her career did not and do not exist "in" the 
dancer, as her ("embodied") intellectual property - as some might want to claim for solo visual artists; instead these 
are worked (and work , or not) in complex relational circumstances. 
The notion, then, of a 'body-knowing', once more a nominalisation of what are in fact multiply-interactive 
processes, merely identifies a performer's past mastery and technical competence, not what she might do, today, in 
the workshop, in testing how the aesthetic implications of a particular working relationship might feel, and what 
they might enable her to do. The term "embodied knowledge" - because of its implication of inherence - fails to 
allow us to identify the qualitative transformations which are both evidence of her creative engagement with 
choreographer and other dancers/composers/spectators, and they are un -owned by her. I would go so far as to 
claim that she is likely to be surprised by their affective power over her, when through certain sorts of interactions 
"they" seem "to appear". She sets out then - because she is an expert and her signature counts - to "personalize[...] 
a composed singularity of vital movements in [such] a way that it could collectively spread"(250). 
That collective spread is vital, in the workshop, because as professional, her concern is also with "composition 
[which] involves the unfolding of an absolutely singular worlding relational whole" (174). In the case of the 
choreographer, we might infer from Massumi's approach, part of her or his art is to`catalyze "a relational 
emergence", which will appear as a recognised-not-yet-seen. That catalyzed relational emergence, and the 
composition which gradually emerges from it, is, Massumi suggests, philosophy in/as action. Its wholly 
"conceptual newness", in philosophical terms, "is there, in the event, enacted " (176). 
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